Re: attacking btrfs filesystems via UUID collisions?

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A bit more about the dd-is-bad-topic:

IMHO it doesn't matter at all.

a) For this specific problem here, fixing a security problem automatically
fixes the risk of data corruption because careless cloning+mounting
(without UUID adjustments) too.
So, if the user likes to use dd with its disadvantages, like waiting hours to
copy lots of free space, and bad practice, etc.etc., why should it concern
the Btrfs developers and/or us here?

b) At wider scope; while Btrfs is more complex than Xfs etc., currently
there is no other reason why things could go bad when dd'ing something.
As long as this holds, is there really a place in the official Btrfs documentation
for telling the users "dd is bad [practice]"?
...


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