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[PATCH 1/1] Add SELinux policy capability for always checking packet class.



Currently the packet class in SELinux is not checked if there are no
SECMARK rules in the security or mangle netfilter tables.  Some systems
prefer that packets are always checked, for example, to protect the system
should the netfilter rules fail to load or if the nefilter rules
were maliciously flushed.

Add the always_check_packets policy capability which, when enabled, treats
SECMARK as enabled, even if there are no netfilter SECMARK rules.

Signed-off-by: Chris PeBenito <cpebenito@xxxxxxxxxx>
---
 security/selinux/hooks.c            |    8 ++++++--
 security/selinux/include/security.h |    2 ++
 security/selinux/selinuxfs.c        |    3 ++-
 security/selinux/ss/services.c      |    3 +++
 4 files changed, 13 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index fa2341b..b818b2d 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -137,12 +137,16 @@ static struct kmem_cache *sel_inode_cache;
  * This function checks the SECMARK reference counter to see if any SECMARK
  * targets are currently configured, if the reference counter is greater than
  * zero SECMARK is considered to be enabled.  Returns true (1) if SECMARK is
- * enabled, false (0) if SECMARK is disabled.
+ * enabled, false (0) if SECMARK is disabled.  If the always_check_packets
+ * policy capability is enabled, SECMARK is always considered enabled.
  *
  */
 static int selinux_secmark_enabled(void)
 {
-	return (atomic_read(&selinux_secmark_refcount) > 0);
+	if (selinux_policycap_alwayspacket)
+		return 1;
+	else
+		return (atomic_read(&selinux_secmark_refcount) > 0);
 }
 
 /*
diff --git a/security/selinux/include/security.h b/security/selinux/include/security.h
index dde2005..ff1b0b8 100644
--- a/security/selinux/include/security.h
+++ b/security/selinux/include/security.h
@@ -68,12 +68,14 @@ extern int selinux_enabled;
 enum {
 	POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_NETPEER,
 	POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_OPENPERM,
+	POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_ALWAYSPACKET,
 	__POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_MAX
 };
 #define POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_MAX (__POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_MAX - 1)
 
 extern int selinux_policycap_netpeer;
 extern int selinux_policycap_openperm;
+extern int selinux_policycap_alwayspacket;
 
 /*
  * type_datum properties
diff --git a/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c b/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c
index 4e93f9e..4a593d0 100644
--- a/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c
+++ b/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c
@@ -44,7 +44,8 @@
 /* Policy capability filenames */
 static char *policycap_names[] = {
 	"network_peer_controls",
-	"open_perms"
+	"open_perms",
+	"always_check_packets"
 };
 
 unsigned int selinux_checkreqprot = CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_CHECKREQPROT_VALUE;
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/services.c b/security/selinux/ss/services.c
index 4321b8f..d81438a 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/services.c
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/services.c
@@ -72,6 +72,7 @@
 
 int selinux_policycap_netpeer;
 int selinux_policycap_openperm;
+int selinux_policycap_alwayspacket;
 
 static DEFINE_RWLOCK(policy_rwlock);
 
@@ -1812,6 +1813,8 @@ static void security_load_policycaps(void)
 						  POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_NETPEER);
 	selinux_policycap_openperm = ebitmap_get_bit(&policydb.policycaps,
 						  POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_OPENPERM);
+	selinux_policycap_alwayspacket = ebitmap_get_bit(&policydb.policycaps,
+						  POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_ALWAYSPACKET);
 }
 
 static int security_preserve_bools(struct policydb *p);
-- 
1.7.8.6


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