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On Thu, 2011-09-22 at 16:37 -0400, Stephen Smalley wrote: > On Thu, 2011-09-22 at 16:32 -0400, Daniel J Walsh wrote: > > -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- > > Hash: SHA1 > > > > On 09/22/2011 04:31 PM, Stephen Smalley wrote: > > > On Thu, 2011-09-22 at 15:53 -0400, Daniel J Walsh wrote: > > >> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 > > >> > > >> Currently if I create a directory labeled > > >> > > >> etc_t:s0:c1 > > >> > > >> And with a process running as unconfined_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023 create > > >> a file within the directory, the file gets created with the > > >> label etc_t:s0. I would like to change the behavior to creating > > >> the file as etc_t:s0:c1. > > >> > > >> That way an administrator could modify files within a sandbox and > > >> have the files be labeled correctly. > > >> > > >> I believe this behavior differs from MLS but believe this would > > >> be what the admin expects. > > >> > > >> Is changing this a kernel or policy issue? > > > > > > That would be a kernel change, and it would have to be configurable > > > so that it can differ for MLS vs MCS. > > > > > It would seem that we should be able to state the behaviour in policy. > > Yes, that was my meaning - allow the default labeling behavior be > configurable in policy. Ideally for each field of the security context. > We already provide significant flexibility through type_transition and > range_transition rules, but not quite what you want here. In effect, > you want the same default behavior for levels as we already have for > types, i.e. inherit from parent directory. Meanwhile, I've seen others > who wanted inherit-from-creating-process for types. So providing a > policy construct to specify the desired default for each context > component would be fine. I think we've even discussed it before. Here was the prior discussion: http://marc.info/?l=selinux&m=129985320617740&w=2 For the range field, it is a little more complicated, as you might want the low or the high level from either the source or the target. Or even a function of them, e.g. the lub. -- Stephen Smalley National Security Agency -- This message was distributed to subscribers of the selinux mailing list. If you no longer wish to subscribe, send mail to majordomo@xxxxxxxxxxxxx with the words "unsubscribe selinux" without quotes as the message.
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