NTSB -- NTSB CITES PACIFIC GAS & ELECTRIC (PG&E) AND GOVERNMENT OVERSIGHT IN FATAL CALIFORNIA PIPELINE RUPTURE

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NTSB PRESS RELEASE

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National Transportation Safety Board

Washington, DC 20594

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE: August 30, 2011

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NTSB CITES PACIFIC GAS & ELECTRIC (PG&E) AND GOVERNMENT

OVERSIGHT IN FATAL CALIFORNIA PIPELINE RUPTURE

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WASHINGTON - Today the five-member National Transportation

Safety Board cited a California utility operator's lax

approach to pipeline safety and the inadequate oversight of

two government agencies in the probable cause of the most

devastating pipeline accident in a decade.

"Our investigation revealed that for years, PG&E exploited

weaknesses in a lax system of oversight," said NTSB Chairman

Deborah A.P. Hersman. "We also identified regulators that

placed a blind trust in the companies that they were charged

with overseeing to the detriment of public safety."

At about 6:11 p.m. (PDT) on September 9, 2010, a 30-inch

diameter segment of a natural gas transmission pipeline,

owned and operated by PG&E, ruptured in a residential

neighborhood in San Bruno, California. The force of the

rupture ejected a 3000-pound 28-foot-long section of pipe

about 100 feet from where it had been buried four feet

underground. The released natural gas ignited into a

towering fire that destroyed 38 homes and damaged 70. As a

result, eight people were killed, dozens were injured, and

many more were evacuated from the area and displaced from

their homes.

The nearly year-long NTSB investigation revealed that PG&E

did not know what kind of pipe it had installed beneath the

city of San Bruno in 1956. PG&E records initially provided

to NTSB investigators indicated that the ruptured section of

pipe was a 30" seamless pipe when in fact, at the time, no

manufacturer produced seamless pipe.

Investigators also determined that the ruptured section of

pipe was a collection of short pipe pieces, commonly known

as "pups," joined together with welds. Further metallurgic

assessment by NTSB investigators determined that some of the

pipe sections did not meet minimum material specifications

and that the welds were poorly constructed.

The defective welds would have been visibly detectable at

the time of the installation, but, because of PG&E's

inadequate quality control during the construction project

and its failure to maintain accurate records, the poorly

welded section of pipe went undetected for over 50 years.

Failure of one of the improperly welded seams caused the

Sept. 9, 2010, rupture during an increase in pressure

resulting from repair work being performed at a terminal

upstream of the rupture site.

The Board determined that the accident was clearly

preventable stating that PG&E's inadequate pipeline

integrity management program failed to identify, detect, and

remove the substandard pipe segments before they ruptured.

"This tragedy began years ago with PG&E's 1956 installation

of a woefully inadequate pipe," said Chairman Hersman. "It

was compounded by a litany of failures - including poor

recordkeeping, inadequate inspection programs, and an

integrity management program without integrity."

In its examination of the history of oversight of PG&E, the

NTSB found that two key regulatory decisions (one by CPUC in

1961 and one by PHMSA in 1970), which "grandfathered", or

exempted, older pipelines from the testing protocols

required of newly constructed ones, allowed the flawed pipe

to escape detection.

The Safety Board found that CPUC, did not effectively

evaluate or assess the safety of PG&E's integrity management

program. On the federal side, the NTSB said that PHMSA's

grandfathering of pre-1970 pipe contributed to the accident.

"For government to do its job - safeguard the public - it

cannot trust alone, it must verify through effective

oversight," said Hersman. "As we saw in San Bruno, when the

approach to safety is lax, the consequences can be deadly."

At the meeting today, the NTSB made a total of 29 safety

recommendations to PG&E, CPUC, PHMSA, the American Gas

Association, the American Petroleum Institute, the Gas

Technology Institute, the Interstate Natural Gas Association

of America, the International Association of Fire Chiefs,

the International Association of Firefighters, and the

National Volunteer Fire Council.

During the course of the investigation, the NTSB issued 10

safety recommendations (six of them classified as urgent) to

PG&E, PHMSA and CPUC to address issues in record-keeping,

information sharing, pipeline testing, and emergency

preparedness and notification procedures.

A synopsis of the NTSB report, including the probable cause,

conclusions, and a complete list of all the safety

recommendations, is available on the NTSB's website, at

http://go.usa.gov/kJd. The NTSB's full report will be

available on the website in several weeks.

RELATED MATERIAL

San Bruno pipeline accident investigation webpage:

http://go.usa.gov/kqy

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NTSB Media Contact: Peter Knudson

(202) 314-6100

peter.knudson@xxxxxxxx

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