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NTSB DETERMINES INADEQUATE RAIL INSPECTION CAUSED 2006 PENNSYLVANIA DERAILMENT



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                      NTSB PRESS RELEASE
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National Transportation Safety Board
Washington, DC 20594

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE: May 13, 2008
SB-08-19

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NTSB DETERMINES INADEQUATE RAIL INSPECTION CAUSED 2006 
PENNSYLVANIA DERAILMENT

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Washington, DC -- The National Transportation Safety Board 
determined today that the probable cause of the derailment 
of a Norfolk Southern Railroad Company train was the 
railroad's inadequate rail inspection and maintenance 
program that resulted in a rail fracture from an undetected 
internal defect.  Contributing to the accident was the 
Federal Railroad Administration's inadequate oversight of 
the internal rail inspection process and its insufficient 
requirements for internal rail inspection.   

On Friday, October 20, 2006, a Norfolk Southern freight 
train (68QB119), en route from the Chicago, Illinois area to 
Sewaren, New Jersey, derailed while crossing the Beaver 
River railroad bridge in New Brighton, Pennsylvania.  The 
train consisted of a three-unit locomotive pulling three 
empty freight cars and 83 tank cars loaded with 660,952 
gallons of denatured ethanol.  Twenty-three of the tank cars 
derailed.  Several of the cars fell into the Beaver River.  
Approximately 20 of the cars released ethanol, a flammable 
liquid that ignited and burned for 48 hours.  A seven-block 
area of New Brighton was evacuated.  There were no injuries 
or fatalities.  

"Because Norfolk Southern did not have an adequate rail 
inspection and maintenance program, they put the public, 
crew, and environment at risk," said NTSB Chairman Mark V. 
Rosenker.    

The track where the derailment occurred was installed in 
1977 and had experienced significant rail head wear prior to 
the accident.  Norfolk Southern had hired a contractor to 
inspect the track for internal rail defects.  In 2006, three 
ultrasonic/induction inspections for internal rail defects 
were conducted on the accident track.  The last inspection 
on August 1, showed an intermittent loss of bottom signal 
over a 9-foot length of rail in the area where the 
derailment subsequently occurred.       

FRA regulations require that all railroads conduct a 
continuous search when inspecting rail for internal defects. 
 Additionally, according to the FRA, any rail inspection 
that is interrupted, as a result of rail surface conditions 
that inhibit the transmission or return of the signal, is 
not considered to be continuous and therefore is not 
considered a valid inspection of the affected rail segment. 
   

However, about a year and a half before the accident and 
without consulting the FRA, Norfolk Southern gave new 
procedures to the inspection contractor for inspecting rail 
for internal defects.  The procedures permitted inspection 
equipment operators to ignore any loss of bottom signal, as 
long as the continuous loss of signal distance did not 
exceed 5 feet of linear rail.  The Safety Board 
investigation found that the initiating defect that caused 
the rail fracture was located in the length of rail that had 
the loss of bottom signal during the August 1 inspection.  
The equipment operator did not stop the inspection vehicle 
for a re-inspection or to hand inspect the rail, consistent 
with the procedures provided by Norfolk Southern.      

"Norfolk Southern was not conducting a continuous search of 
their rail for internal defects, which left segments of rail 
uninspected and in service indefinitely," Rosenker said.  
"This accident illustrates the importance of having a 
comprehensive rail inspection and maintenance program that 
will account for factors such as rail head wear and loss of 
signal during internal testing." 

As a result of this accident, the Safety Board made the 
following recommendations:

To the Federal Railroad Administration:

1.	Review all railroads' internal rail defect 
detection procedures and require changes to those 
procedures as necessary to eliminate exceptions to 
the requirement for an uninterrupted, continuous 
search for rail defects.

2.	Require railroads to develop rail inspection and 
maintenance programs based on damage-tolerance 
principles and approve those programs.  Include in 
the requirement that railroads demonstrate how 
their programs will identify and remove internal 
defects before they reach critical size and result 
in catastrophic rail failures.  Each program should 
take into account, at a minimum, accumulated 
tonnage, track geometry, rail surface conditions, 
rail head wear, rail steel specifications, track 
support, residual stresses in the rail, rail defect 
growth rates, and temperature differentials.

3.	Require that railroads use methods that accurately 
measure rail head wear to ensure the deformation of 
the head does not affect the accuracy of the 
measurements.

4.	Assist the Pipeline and Hazardous Material Safety 
Administration in its evaluation of the risk posed 
to train crews by unit trains transporting 
hazardous material, determination of the optimum 
separation requirements between occupied 
locomotives and hazardous material cars, and any 
resulting revision of 49 Code of Federal 
Regulations 174.85.

To the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety 
Administration:

5.	With the assistance of the Federal Railroad 
Administration, evaluate the risk posed to train 
crews by unit trains transporting hazardous 
materials, determine the optimum separation 
requirements between occupied locomotives and 
hazardous material cars, and revise 49 Code of 
Federal Regulations 174.85 accordingly.

To Norfolk Southern: 

6.	Revise your ultrasonic rail inspection procedures 
to eliminate exceptions to the requirement for 
uninterrupted, continuous search for rail defects.

A synopsis of the Board's report, including the probable 
cause and recommendations, is available on the website, 
www.ntsb.gov, under Board Meetings.  The full report will be 
available on the website in several weeks. 

-30- 


Media Contact: Terry N. Williams, 202-314-6100
				         williat@xxxxxxxx










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