INADEQUATE PROCEDURES AND SAFEGUARDS CONTRIBUTED TO TWO WMATA METRORAIL ACCIDENTS FATAL TO WAYSIDE WORKERS, NTSB FINDS

[NTSB Press Releases <NTSBPressReleases@xxxxxxxx>]

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                      NTSB PRESS RELEASE
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National Transportation Safety Board
Washington, DC 20594

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE: January 23, 2008
SB-08-05

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INADEQUATE PROCEDURES AND SAFEGUARDS CONTRIBUTED TO TWO 
WMATA METRORAIL ACCIDENTS FATAL TO WAYSIDE WORKERS, NTSB FINDS



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Washington, D. C. - The National Transportation Safety Board today determined 
the probable causes of two Washington Metropolitan Area 
Transit Authority (WMATA) Metrorail accidents that resulted 
in three employee fatalities, and called on WMATA to tighten 
rules governing wayside worker safety.

        "The safety provisions that are in place are 
understandably geared to the thousands of the daily Metro 
commuters," said NTSB Chairman Mark V. Rosenker.  "However, 
we also need to make sure that the same attention to safety 
is established for employees who service and maintain the 
track, signals, and railcars for the Metro system."

        On Sunday, May 14, 2006, a southbound WMATA Metrorail 
Red Line subway train struck and killed a Metrorail employee 
as the train was about to enter the Dupont Circle station in 
Washington, D. C.   The employee was an automatic train 
control system mechanic who had been working with two other 
mechanics at the interlocking just north of the Dupont 
Circle station.  All three mechanics had moved between the 
two main tracks north of the interlocking in order to stay 
clear of a northbound train that was leaving the station.  
As the southbound accident train was arriving, the other two 
mechanics remained in the clear between the two trains as 
they passed and were not injured.  According to signal 
system data logs, the southbound train was moving about 40 
mph as it traveled past the interlocking.

        The Safety Board determined that the probable cause of 
the Dupont Circle accident was the failure of the automatic 
train control system mechanic to stay clear of the 
approaching southbound train either because he was not aware 
of the presence of the train or because he lacked a physical 
reference by which to identify a safe area outside the 
train's dynamic envelope.  

        On Thursday, November 30, 2006, a northbound WMATA 
Metrorail Yellow Line subway train struck and fatally 
injured two Metrorail employees who were performing a 
routine walking inspection of main track near the Eisenhower 
Avenue Metrorail station in Alexandria, Virginia.  The 
accident occurred as the northbound train was traveling 
about 35 mph along track normally used for southbound 
traffic.

        The Safety Board determined that the probable cause of 
the Eisenhower Avenue accident was the failure of the train 
operator to slow or stop the train until she could be 
certain that the workers ahead were aware of its approach 
and had moved to a safe area.

        Contributing to both accidents were WMATA Metrorail 
right-of-way rules and procedures that did not provide 
adequate safeguards to protect wayside personnel from 
approaching trains, that did not ensure that train operators 
were aware of wayside work being performed, and that did not 
adequately provide for reduced train speeds through work 
areas.  Also contributing to these accidents was the lack of 
an aggressive program of rule compliance testing and 
enforcement on the Metrorail system.

        In the report released today, the Safety Board noted 
that in both the Dupont Circle and Eisenhower Avenue 
accidents, train operators ran their trains as if no workers 
were present or were likely to be present along their 
routes.  The rules and procedures in effect at the time did 
not require that trains be operated in manual mode or at 
reduced speeds through work areas, either of which would 
have given the train operators a better opportunity to 
respond if wayside workers failed to move into the clear at 
the approach of a train.  

        The Safety Board found that the rules cited in WMATA's 
Metrorail Safety Rules and Procedures Handbook, did not 
account for the fact that, depending on the sight distance 
as shown in both accidents, trains being operated at normal 
speeds may not be able to stop short of wayside workers who 
are unaware of the train's approach and  have failed to move 
to a safe area.  The rules did permit wayside workers to 
request that the control center reduce train operating 
speeds in the areas in which they were working, but as 
revealed by the Board's investigation, such requests were 
discouraged by train controllers and seldom made.

        The Board determined that technology can provide 
additional protection for wayside workers, especially in a 
work environment in which a lapse of attention can quickly 
result in serious injury or death.  There is technology that 
can provide alerts to both the train operator and the 
wayside workers, the Board noted.  These systems provide 
train operators with an audible and visual alarm when they 
are approaching wayside workers who are near the tracks and 
warnings to wayside workers who are wearing a personal 
warning device.  Therefore the Safety Board believes the 
WMATA should promptly implement appropriate technology that 
will automatically alert wayside workers of approaching 
trains and will automatically alert train operators when 
approaching areas with workers on or near the tracks.

        As a result of these accident investigations, the 
Safety Board made recommendations to WMATA regarding wayside 
worker protection, compliance of WMATA safety rules, and 
technologies for wayside worker protection.

        A synopsis of the Board's reports, including the 
probable cause and recommendations, are available on the 
NTSB's website, www.ntsb.gov, under "Board Meetings." The 
Board's full reports will be available on the website in 
several weeks.
 
  -30-

Media Contact: Keith Holloway, 202-314-6100
hollowk@xxxxxxxx 







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