|
|
| [Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index] |
************************************************************
NTSB PRESS RELEASE
************************************************************
National Transportation Safety Board
Washington, DC 20594
FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE: January 10, 2008
SB-08-01
************************************************************
CREW MISTAKES CAUSED HEELING OF CROWN PRINCESS CRUISE SHIP
************************************************************
The National Transportation Safety Board today
determined that the probable cause of an accident involving
the cruise ship Crown Princess was the second officer's
incorrect wheel commands, executed first to counter an
unanticipated high rate of turn and then to counter the
vessel's heeling.
Contributing to the cause of the accident were the
captain's and staff captain's inappropriate inputs to the
vessel's integrated navigation system while it was traveling
at high speed in relatively shallow water, their failure to
stabilize the vessel's heading fluctuations before leaving
the bridge, and the inadequate training of crewmembers in
the use of integrated navigation systems.
"We see from this accident the importance of having
adequate training," said NTSB Mark V. Rosenker. "Had the
crew been better trained in the equipment they were using,
this accident may not have occurred, and implementing our
recommendations is one way to help ensure this."
On July 18, 2006, the cruise ship Crown Princess,
which had been in service about a month, departed Port
Canaveral, Florida, for Brooklyn, New York, its last port on
a 10-day round trip voyage to the Caribbean. About an hour
after departing, the vessel's automatic navigation system
caused the ship's heading to fluctuate around its intended
course. Alarmed by a perceived high rate of turn, the second
officer attempted to take corrective action that resulted in
the ship heeling to a maximum angle of about 24 degrees to
starboard. This caused people to be thrown about or struck
by unsecured objects, resulting in 14 serious and 284 minor
injuries to passengers and crewmembers. The vessel incurred
no damage to its structure but sustained considerable damage
to unsecured interior components, cabinets, and their
contents.
The report adopted by the Board today states that the
Crown Princess was operating at nearly full speed when the
second officer took the controls. Because of instabilities
in the automatic steering system, the officer faced the
problem of navigating a vessel that exhibited both
increasing course deviations and high rates of turn. The
second officer took manual control of the steering and
steered back and forth between port and starboard in
increasingly wider turns. Rather than remedying the problem,
the second officer's actions aggravated the situation,
resulting in a very large angle of heel. The captain quickly
returned to the bridge and brought the vessel under control
by centering the rudder and reducing speed. The Safety Board
concluded that the incident occurred because the second
officer initially turned the wheel to port, when he should
have turned it to starboard to counteract the turn.
The Safety Board also stated that the captain and
staff captain made errors with regard to the ship's
integrated navigation system. These errors included:
* Failure to recognize that the integrated navigation
system could be unpredictable at high speed in shallow
water.
* Failure to recognize that the rudder economy and
rudder limit settings on the integrated navigation
system were inappropriate for the vessel's speed and
operating conditions.
The Board concluded that these errors stemmed from
inadequate training and lack of familiarity with the
integrated navigation system.
As a result of its investigation, the Safety Board
made recommendations regarding integrated navigation system
training to the U.S. Coast Guard, the Cruise Lines
International Association, and to SAM Electronics and Sperry
Marine, manufacturers of integrated navigation systems.
A synopsis of the Board's report, including the
probable cause and recommendations, is available on the
NTSB's website, www.ntsb.gov, under "Board Meetings." The
Board's full report will be available on the website in
several weeks.
Media Contact: Keith Holloway (202) 314-6100
hollowk@xxxxxxxx
************************************************************
This message is delivered to you as a free service from the
National Transportation Safety Board.
You may unsubscribe at any time at
http://www.ntsb.gov/registration/registration.htm
An archive of press releases is available at
http://www.ntsb.gov/pressrel/pressrel.htm
Current job opportunities with the NTSB are listed at
http://www.ntsb.gov/vacancies/listing.htm
For questions/problems, contact pubinq@xxxxxxxx
[FAA] [STB] [USDA] [Photography] [Yosemite Camping] [Hot Springs] [Steve's Art] [SB Lupus] [Railroad] [FDA News]