NTSB RECOMMENDS FIRE SUPPRESSION SYSTEMS ON ALL CARGO AIRPLANES

[NTSB Press Releases <NTSBPressReleases@xxxxxxxx>]

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                      NTSB PRESS RELEASE
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National Transportation Safety Board
Washington, DC 20594

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE: December 4, 2007
SB-07-60

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NTSB RECOMMENDS FIRE SUPPRESSION SYSTEMS ON ALL CARGO 
AIRPLANES


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The National Transportation Safety Board has 
recommended that the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) 
require that all cargo airplanes operating under Part 121 
Code of Federal Regulations install fire suppression 
systems.  This recommendation is a result of the Board's 
investigation of a UPS DC-8 cargo fire in Philadelphia last 
year. 

        The Safety Board released today a final report that 
determined the probable cause of this accident was an in-
flight fire that initiated from an unknown source within one 
of the containers in the main cargo compartment. The report 
concluded that the threat from cargo fires could be 
mitigated by the installation of fire suppression systems.

        On February 7, 2006, about 11:59 pm (EST), United 
Parcel Service Company (UPS) flight 1307, a McDonnell 
Douglas DC-8-71F, landed at Philadelphia International 
Airport (PHL), Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, after a cargo 
smoke indication in the cockpit.  The captain, first 
officer, and flight engineer evacuated from the airplane 
after landing.  The flight crewmembers sustained minor 
injuries, and the airplane and most of the cargo were 
destroyed by fire after landing.

        "While we may not know the source of the fire which 
caused this accident, our investigators have done an 
excellent job of highlighting possible solutions that will 
address hazards associated with in-flight fires," said NTSB 
Chairman Mark V. Rosenker.

        In the report adopted today, it states that 
examinations of the recovered components revealed no 
evidence of any preexisting powerplant, structural, or 
system failures.  Also noted was that given the length of 
time that the fire burned and the resulting destruction of 
potentially helpful evidence, the post-fire condition of the 
cargo containers and contents and the surrounding airplane 
structure provided no evidence that indicated what initiated 
the fire.  The investigation also revealed that several 
electronic devices containing secondary lithium batteries 
were onboard the airplane.  Unfortunately, the lack of 
information about the devices or the batteries prevented any 
determination of whether these batteries were associated 
with previously known recalls and contributory 
and/or causal to the fire. The exact origin and 
cause of the in-flight fire on board the airplane could not 
be determined due to the destruction of potentially helpful 
evidence; however, available evidence suggest that the fire 
most likely originated in main cargo compartment.  

        Safety Board investigators reviewed the fire and smoke 
detection system certification requirements.  The 
examination revealed that the current certification test 
standards and guidance for smoke or fire detection systems 
on board many aircraft are not adequate.  They do not 
account for the effects of cargo containers on airflow 
around the detection sensors and on the containment of smoke 
from a fire inside a container.  The report states that 
evidence indicates that the fire initially did not generate 
a significant amount of smoke and most likely initiated as a 
smoldering fire inside a cargo container.  The construction 
of the cargo containers, which results in restricted airflow 
in or out of the container, likely inhibited the growth and 
detection of the fire in its initial stages.  

        "We have identified several safety issues where 
improvements in the aviation cargo industry could make 
transporting of goods safer.  Our safety recommendations are 
essential tools that if implemented can ensure that this 
will happen," Rosenker said. 

        As a result of its investigation, the Safety Board 
made recommendations in the following areas including: 
guidance and checklists relating to in-flight fire and 
smoke, certification requirements for smoke and fire 
detection system tests, fire suppression system 
requirements, aircraft rescue and firefighting training, 
cargo airplane emergency exit requirements, hazardous 
materials information and dissemination procedures, and 
transport of lithium batteries on board aircraft.

        These recommendations were addressed to the Federal 
Aviation Administration, the Pipeline and Hazardous 
Materials Safety Administration, and the Cargo Airline 
Association.

        A synopsis of the Board's report, including the 
probable cause and recommendations, is available on the 
NTSB's website, www.ntsb.gov, under "Board Meetings." The 
Board's full report will be available on the website in 
several weeks.
 
              -30-
 
Media Contact: Keith Holloway, 202-314-6100
hollowk@xxxxxxxx 









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