Re: [SECURITY] CAN info leak/minor heap overflow

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> Why is this bad? Can the addresses of CAN-BCM sock structs be used for
> anything from userspace?
> For me they are just intented to be unique numbers ...

This is a bad idea because it makes exploiting other kernel
vulnerabilities easier.  Exposing the address of an object in a slab
cache, especially an object that unprivileged users have some level of
control of, is just an invitation to use that structure when writing
exploits, for heap overflows or otherwise.


> > Secondly,
> > on 64-bit platforms, up to 17 bytes may be copied into the buffer.
> Hm - that's indeed not wanted. Will send a patch at least for this issue.
> > Fortunately, structure padding will most likely prevent this from being
> > a problem, except for the trailing NULL byte, which may overwrite the
> > first byte of the next heap object.  Please name your procfile in a way
> > that doesn't leak information and fits into the desired name buffer.
> > 
> > -Dan
> > 
> Regards,
> Oliver

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