[PATCH] crypto_memcmp: add constant-time memcmp

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When comparing MAC hashes, AEAD authentication tags, or other hash
values in the context of authentication or integrity checking, it
is important not to leak timing information to a potential attacker.

Bytewise memory comparisons (such as memcmp) are usually optimized so
that they return a nonzero value as soon as a mismatch is found.
This early-return behavior can leak timing information, allowing an
attacker to iteratively guess the correct result.

This patch adds a new method crypto_memcmp that has the same prototype
as standard memcmp, but that compares strings of the same length in
roughly constant time (cache misses could change the timing, but
since they don't reveal information about the content of the strings
being compared, they are effectively benign).  Note that crypto_memcmp
(unlike memcmp) can only be used to test for equality or inequality,
NOT greater-than or less-than.  This is not an issue for its use-cases
within the Crypto API.

I tried to locate all of the places in the Crypto API where memcmp was
being used for authentication or integrity checking, and convert them
over to crypto_memcmp.

crypto_memcmp is declared noinline and placed in its own source file
because a very smart compiler (or LTO) might notice that the return
value is always compared against zero/nonzero, and might then
reintroduce the same early-return optimization that we are trying to
avoid.

Signed-off-by: James Yonan <james@xxxxxxxxxxx>
---
 crypto/Makefile                         |  2 +-
 crypto/asymmetric_keys/rsa.c            |  5 +++--
 crypto/authenc.c                        |  7 ++++---
 crypto/authencesn.c                     |  9 +++++----
 crypto/ccm.c                            |  5 +++--
 crypto/crypto_memcmp.c                  | 31 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 crypto/gcm.c                            |  3 ++-
 include/crypto/internal/crypto_memcmp.h | 20 ++++++++++++++++++++
 8 files changed, 69 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-)
 create mode 100644 crypto/crypto_memcmp.c
 create mode 100644 include/crypto/internal/crypto_memcmp.h

diff --git a/crypto/Makefile b/crypto/Makefile
index 2ba0df2..39a574d 100644
--- a/crypto/Makefile
+++ b/crypto/Makefile
@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@
 #
 
 obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO) += crypto.o
-crypto-y := api.o cipher.o compress.o
+crypto-y := api.o cipher.o compress.o crypto_memcmp.o
 
 obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_WORKQUEUE) += crypto_wq.o
 
diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/rsa.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/rsa.c
index 4a6a069..4f9a250 100644
--- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/rsa.c
+++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/rsa.c
@@ -13,6 +13,7 @@
 #include <linux/module.h>
 #include <linux/kernel.h>
 #include <linux/slab.h>
+#include <crypto/internal/crypto_memcmp.h>
 #include "public_key.h"
 
 MODULE_LICENSE("GPL");
@@ -189,12 +190,12 @@ static int RSA_verify(const u8 *H, const u8 *EM, size_t k, size_t hash_size,
 		}
 	}
 
-	if (memcmp(asn1_template, EM + T_offset, asn1_size) != 0) {
+	if (crypto_memcmp(asn1_template, EM + T_offset, asn1_size) != 0) {
 		kleave(" = -EBADMSG [EM[T] ASN.1 mismatch]");
 		return -EBADMSG;
 	}
 
-	if (memcmp(H, EM + T_offset + asn1_size, hash_size) != 0) {
+	if (crypto_memcmp(H, EM + T_offset + asn1_size, hash_size) != 0) {
 		kleave(" = -EKEYREJECTED [EM[T] hash mismatch]");
 		return -EKEYREJECTED;
 	}
diff --git a/crypto/authenc.c b/crypto/authenc.c
index ffce19d..82ca98f 100644
--- a/crypto/authenc.c
+++ b/crypto/authenc.c
@@ -13,6 +13,7 @@
 #include <crypto/aead.h>
 #include <crypto/internal/hash.h>
 #include <crypto/internal/skcipher.h>
+#include <crypto/internal/crypto_memcmp.h>
 #include <crypto/authenc.h>
 #include <crypto/scatterwalk.h>
 #include <linux/err.h>
@@ -188,7 +189,7 @@ static void authenc_verify_ahash_update_done(struct crypto_async_request *areq,
 	scatterwalk_map_and_copy(ihash, areq_ctx->sg, areq_ctx->cryptlen,
 				 authsize, 0);
 
-	err = memcmp(ihash, ahreq->result, authsize) ? -EBADMSG : 0;
+	err = crypto_memcmp(ihash, ahreq->result, authsize) ? -EBADMSG : 0;
 	if (err)
 		goto out;
 
@@ -227,7 +228,7 @@ static void authenc_verify_ahash_done(struct crypto_async_request *areq,
 	scatterwalk_map_and_copy(ihash, areq_ctx->sg, areq_ctx->cryptlen,
 				 authsize, 0);
 
-	err = memcmp(ihash, ahreq->result, authsize) ? -EBADMSG : 0;
+	err = crypto_memcmp(ihash, ahreq->result, authsize) ? -EBADMSG : 0;
 	if (err)
 		goto out;
 
@@ -462,7 +463,7 @@ static int crypto_authenc_verify(struct aead_request *req,
 	ihash = ohash + authsize;
 	scatterwalk_map_and_copy(ihash, areq_ctx->sg, areq_ctx->cryptlen,
 				 authsize, 0);
-	return memcmp(ihash, ohash, authsize) ? -EBADMSG : 0;
+	return crypto_memcmp(ihash, ohash, authsize) ? -EBADMSG : 0;
 }
 
 static int crypto_authenc_iverify(struct aead_request *req, u8 *iv,
diff --git a/crypto/authencesn.c b/crypto/authencesn.c
index ab53762..ec3bef9 100644
--- a/crypto/authencesn.c
+++ b/crypto/authencesn.c
@@ -15,6 +15,7 @@
 #include <crypto/aead.h>
 #include <crypto/internal/hash.h>
 #include <crypto/internal/skcipher.h>
+#include <crypto/internal/crypto_memcmp.h>
 #include <crypto/authenc.h>
 #include <crypto/scatterwalk.h>
 #include <linux/err.h>
@@ -247,7 +248,7 @@ static void authenc_esn_verify_ahash_update_done(struct crypto_async_request *ar
 	scatterwalk_map_and_copy(ihash, areq_ctx->sg, areq_ctx->cryptlen,
 				 authsize, 0);
 
-	err = memcmp(ihash, ahreq->result, authsize) ? -EBADMSG : 0;
+	err = crypto_memcmp(ihash, ahreq->result, authsize) ? -EBADMSG : 0;
 	if (err)
 		goto out;
 
@@ -296,7 +297,7 @@ static void authenc_esn_verify_ahash_update_done2(struct crypto_async_request *a
 	scatterwalk_map_and_copy(ihash, areq_ctx->sg, areq_ctx->cryptlen,
 				 authsize, 0);
 
-	err = memcmp(ihash, ahreq->result, authsize) ? -EBADMSG : 0;
+	err = crypto_memcmp(ihash, ahreq->result, authsize) ? -EBADMSG : 0;
 	if (err)
 		goto out;
 
@@ -336,7 +337,7 @@ static void authenc_esn_verify_ahash_done(struct crypto_async_request *areq,
 	scatterwalk_map_and_copy(ihash, areq_ctx->sg, areq_ctx->cryptlen,
 				 authsize, 0);
 
-	err = memcmp(ihash, ahreq->result, authsize) ? -EBADMSG : 0;
+	err = crypto_memcmp(ihash, ahreq->result, authsize) ? -EBADMSG : 0;
 	if (err)
 		goto out;
 
@@ -568,7 +569,7 @@ static int crypto_authenc_esn_verify(struct aead_request *req)
 	ihash = ohash + authsize;
 	scatterwalk_map_and_copy(ihash, areq_ctx->sg, areq_ctx->cryptlen,
 				 authsize, 0);
-	return memcmp(ihash, ohash, authsize) ? -EBADMSG : 0;
+	return crypto_memcmp(ihash, ohash, authsize) ? -EBADMSG : 0;
 }
 
 static int crypto_authenc_esn_iverify(struct aead_request *req, u8 *iv,
diff --git a/crypto/ccm.c b/crypto/ccm.c
index 499c917..57349d3 100644
--- a/crypto/ccm.c
+++ b/crypto/ccm.c
@@ -12,6 +12,7 @@
 
 #include <crypto/internal/aead.h>
 #include <crypto/internal/skcipher.h>
+#include <crypto/internal/crypto_memcmp.h>
 #include <crypto/scatterwalk.h>
 #include <linux/err.h>
 #include <linux/init.h>
@@ -363,7 +364,7 @@ static void crypto_ccm_decrypt_done(struct crypto_async_request *areq,
 
 	if (!err) {
 		err = crypto_ccm_auth(req, req->dst, cryptlen);
-		if (!err && memcmp(pctx->auth_tag, pctx->odata, authsize))
+		if (!err && crypto_memcmp(pctx->auth_tag, pctx->odata, authsize))
 			err = -EBADMSG;
 	}
 	aead_request_complete(req, err);
@@ -422,7 +423,7 @@ static int crypto_ccm_decrypt(struct aead_request *req)
 		return err;
 
 	/* verify */
-	if (memcmp(authtag, odata, authsize))
+	if (crypto_memcmp(authtag, odata, authsize))
 		return -EBADMSG;
 
 	return err;
diff --git a/crypto/crypto_memcmp.c b/crypto/crypto_memcmp.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..ef4101c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/crypto_memcmp.c
@@ -0,0 +1,31 @@
+/*
+ * Constant-time memcmp.
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2013 OpenVPN Technologies Inc.
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify it
+ * under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by the Free
+ * Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or (at your option)
+ * any later version.
+ */
+
+#include <linux/export.h>
+#include <crypto/internal/crypto_memcmp.h>
+
+/**
+ * Like memcmp(), but constant-time to prevent leakage of timing info.
+ * Returns 0 when data is equal, non-zero otherwise.
+ */
+noinline int crypto_memcmp(const void *a, const void *b, size_t size)
+{
+	const u8 *a1 = a;
+	const u8 *b1 = b;
+	int ret = 0;
+	size_t i;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < size; i++) {
+		ret |= *a1++ ^ *b1++;
+	}
+	return ret;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(crypto_memcmp);
diff --git a/crypto/gcm.c b/crypto/gcm.c
index 43e1fb0..6be5bca 100644
--- a/crypto/gcm.c
+++ b/crypto/gcm.c
@@ -12,6 +12,7 @@
 #include <crypto/internal/aead.h>
 #include <crypto/internal/skcipher.h>
 #include <crypto/internal/hash.h>
+#include <crypto/internal/crypto_memcmp.h>
 #include <crypto/scatterwalk.h>
 #include <crypto/hash.h>
 #include "internal.h"
@@ -582,7 +583,7 @@ static int crypto_gcm_verify(struct aead_request *req,
 
 	crypto_xor(auth_tag, iauth_tag, 16);
 	scatterwalk_map_and_copy(iauth_tag, req->src, cryptlen, authsize, 0);
-	return memcmp(iauth_tag, auth_tag, authsize) ? -EBADMSG : 0;
+	return crypto_memcmp(iauth_tag, auth_tag, authsize) ? -EBADMSG : 0;
 }
 
 static void gcm_decrypt_done(struct crypto_async_request *areq, int err)
diff --git a/include/crypto/internal/crypto_memcmp.h b/include/crypto/internal/crypto_memcmp.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..db23cc0
--- /dev/null
+++ b/include/crypto/internal/crypto_memcmp.h
@@ -0,0 +1,20 @@
+/*
+ * Constant-time memcmp.
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2013 OpenVPN Technologies Inc.
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify it
+ * under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by the Free
+ * Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or (at your option)
+ * any later version.
+ */
+
+#ifndef _CRYPTO_INTERNAL_CRYPTO_MEMCMP_H
+#define _CRYPTO_INTERNAL_CRYPTO_MEMCMP_H
+
+#include <linux/types.h>
+#include <linux/compiler.h>
+
+noinline int crypto_memcmp(const void *a, const void *b, size_t size);
+
+#endif
-- 
1.8.1.2

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