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On 24/04/12 18:37, Daniel J Walsh wrote:
The other thing I need to be able to do is constrain a process to only permit it to change a context from c1 -> c2 (or label1 -> label2 in the general case). Is this possible to manage in a policy at all and if so is there any runtime flexibility over the rules that can be created to allow me to specify the only legal changes are c1 -> c2 -> c3 -> end for process1-1 and c1 -> c2 -> c3 -> c4-> c5 -> end for process1-2. Essentially, I need to be able to ensure that a process cannot change the security labelling to bypass a stage in the chain.-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 On 04/24/2012 01:16 PM, Tim Sheppard wrote:Hi, I am looking to use SELinux to secure a process that is made up of a number of discrete, sequential stages. One stage communicates to the next by writing results to a file and then an external process modifies the SELinux context of the file to allow the next stage to read the file and so on until the final stage is reached and the processing stops. The problem I have is that the number of stages is variable and can change with each invocation of the process, i.e. when I create the process I know the number of stages that will be required in it, but the number of stages could change with each invocation. I think therefore, that I need a means of creating new contexts on the fly and assigning them to the processes. Is it possible with SELinux to create a new security context (domain for the output file, and user/role for the stage process) on the fly and execute a process within that context such that it could poll a directory for input files and, if it is permitted to read the file perform its operation? Many Thanks, Tim SheppardIf each process is going to require the same approximate access. I would use MCS labeling for separation. Basically define a sandbox type for your processes to run within and then have your controlling app pick an MCS label for the process and the content. chcon -t confined_file_t -l s0:c1 passing.file runcon -t confined_proc_t -l s0:c1 proc1 When done chcon -l s0:c2 passing.file runcon -t confined_proc_t -l s0:c2 proc2 ... -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v1.4.12 (GNU/Linux) Comment: Using GnuPG with Mozilla - http://enigmail.mozdev.org/ iEYEARECAAYFAk+W5O4ACgkQrlYvE4MpobNfcgCdHfJl2HRNfsi3YsAou1lA4MY9 gfIAoNzG8u5W3o9f7LUAixBSxvaLyXyE =iHPC -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
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