Re: Necessity for device overwriting?
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> > Can an attacker discern the size of individual files if the device has not > > been overwritten first? > > It´s a practical approach to give you a better understanding. Try less -f > /dev/sdX on the device you are going to encrypt. A blank block device is filled > with zeros or continually the same single character. Issuing shred /dev/sdX > shows strong resemblance to what loop-aes encryption leaves behind. > In case only a first fraction of a block device is filled with such random > (looking) data one might suggest you to reveal keys/passes to uncover the real > nature of this information. In case you find a method of storing data using just > one character please inform me as soon as possible ;-) Ok so you're saying it is about plausible deniability concerning the likelihood of there being encrypted data there, not about trying to uncover anything actually usable about the encrypted plaintext. - Linux-crypto: cryptography in and on the Linux system Archive: http://mail.nl.linux.org/linux-crypto/