Re: the cold-boot attack - a paper tiger?
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Proactive defense is best - after all, recovery of "burnt in" keys from RAM in the manner of the Peter Guttman paper (as opposed to this) has never been claimed to have done afaikt, but Jari still implemented "key shredding" (actually hopping keys around to prevent "burn in") nonetheless on the offchance that it had been or would be done and no-one was saying. But these people claim this so-called "cold-boot" (so-called because they're actually avoiding rebooting) attack has been done and works on loop-aes. (Ok the source code would be nice, I still don't imagine this is rocket science. It is not wise to dismiss this out of hand because these people don't seem to understand that they *have* to release the sourcecode if they want others to validate their results.) And we know we don't have to see the sourcecode in order for an effective defense to be developed against this attack (the kernel thread + register approach). - Linux-crypto: cryptography in and on the Linux system Archive: http://mail.nl.linux.org/linux-crypto/