Google
  Web www.spinics.net

Re: the cold-boot attack - a paper tiger?

[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index]


Proactive defense is best - after all, recovery of
"burnt in" keys from RAM in the manner of the Peter
Guttman paper (as opposed to this) has never been
claimed to have done afaikt, but Jari still
implemented "key shredding" (actually hopping keys
around to prevent "burn in") nonetheless on the
offchance that it had been or would be done and no-one
was saying.

But these people claim this so-called "cold-boot"
(so-called because they're actually avoiding
rebooting) attack has been done and works on loop-aes.

(Ok the source code would be nice, I still don't
imagine this is rocket science.  It is not wise to
dismiss this out of hand because these people don't
seem to understand that they *have* to release the
sourcecode if they want others to validate their
results.)

And we know we don't have to see the sourcecode in
order for an effective defense to be developed against
this attack (the kernel thread + register approach).


      

-
Linux-crypto:  cryptography in and on the Linux system
Archive:       http://mail.nl.linux.org/linux-crypto/


[Home]     [Kernel]     [Linux Crypto]     [Gnu Crypto]     [Gnu Classpath]     [Netfilter]     [Bugtraq]     [Network Security Reading]

Add to Google