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Re: [PATCH v17 01/15] Add PR_{GET,SET}_NO_NEW_PRIVS to prevent execve from granting privs



On Fri, Apr 6, 2012 at 2:55 PM, Andrew Morton <akpm@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
> On Thu, 29 Mar 2012 15:01:46 -0500
> Will Drewry <wad@xxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
>
>> From: Andy Lutomirski <luto@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
>>
>> With this set, a lot of dangerous operations (chroot, unshare, etc)
>> become a lot less dangerous because there is no possibility of
>> subverting privileged binaries.
>
> The changelog doesn't explain the semantics of the new syscall.
> There's a comment way-down-there which I guess suffices, if you hunt
> for it.

I'll bubble up luto's comment into the changelog when I resend the
grand-unified-patchset.

> And the changelog doesn't explain why this is being added.  Presumably
> seccomp_filter wants/needs this feature but whowhatwherewhenwhy?  Spell
> it all out, please.

I'll try my hand at that and luto@ can yell at me if I misrepresent.
Seem reasonable?

> The new syscall mode will be documented in the prctl manpage.  Please
> cc linux-man@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx and work with Michael on getting this
> done?

I'll add linux-man to the patch series since this applies to both
no_new_privs and seccomp filter.

Thanks!

>>
>> ...
>>
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