Re: [PATCH v17 01/15] Add PR_{GET,SET}_NO_NEW_PRIVS to prevent execve from granting privs

[Andrew Morton <akpm@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>]

On Thu, 29 Mar 2012 15:01:46 -0500
Will Drewry <wad@xxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:

> From: Andy Lutomirski <luto@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
> 
> With this set, a lot of dangerous operations (chroot, unshare, etc)
> become a lot less dangerous because there is no possibility of
> subverting privileged binaries.
> 
> This patch completely breaks apparmor.  Someone who understands (and
> uses) apparmor should fix it or at least give me a hint.

So [patch 2/15] fixes all this up?

I guess we should join the two patches into one, to avoid a silly
breakage window.  That means that John loses a brownie point, but we
can mention him in the changelog, include his signed-off-by:

> Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>

Several of these patches are missing your signed-off-by:.  They should
all have your SOB, because you sent them. 
Documentation/SubmittingPatches explains this.

I'm trying to find a way to merge all this code without reviewing it ;)
Alas, this is against my rules.  Given the length of time for which
this patchset has been floating around, I'm a little surprised by the
lack of acked-by's and reviewed-by's.  Have you been gathering them all
up?  Are the networking guys all happy about this patchset?


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